European identity and redistributive preferences by Costa-Font, Joan & Cowell, Frank
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1362 
July 2015 
European Identity and Redistributive Preferences 
Joan Cost Font 
Frank Cowell 
Abstract 
How important is spatial identity in shifting preferences for redistribution? This paper takes advantage of within-
country variability in the adoption of a single currency as an instrument to examine the impact of the rescaling of 
spatial identity in Europe. We draw upon data from the last three decades of waves of the European Values Survey 
and we examine the impact of joining the single currency on preferences for re-distribution. Our instrumentation 
strategy relies on using the exogenous effect of joining a common currency, alongside a battery of robustness 
checks and alternative instruments. Our findings suggest that joining the euro has a boosting effect on European 
identity; an opposite and comparable effect is found for national pride. We find that European identity increases 
preferences for redistribution, and that national pride exerts an equivalent reduction in preferences for 
redistribution. 
Keywords: Spatial identity, Europe, welfare state support 
JEL codes: D69; O52; H53 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Community Programme. The Centre for Economic Performance 
is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We are very grateful to Ilia Karmanov and Ju-lia Philipp for excellent research assistance and to STICERD for 
funding support. 
Joan Costa Font, Associate Professor of Political Economy, London School of Economics and 
Associate at Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. Frank Cowell, Professor of 
Economics, London School of Economics and Associate at STICERD, London School of Economics. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in 
any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or 
circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor at the 
above address. 
 J. Costa Font and F. Cowell, submitted 2015. 
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 3
2.1 Preferences for redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 European identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Our approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Data and Methods 6
3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 The Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Results 9
4.1 Preliminary Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 Conclusion 22
A Appendix 26
A.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1.1 Summary characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1.2 Background information: Citizenship education . . . . . 27
A.1.3 Background information: Foreign language proﬁciency . 29
A.1.4 Background information: Medals in Olympic Games . . . 31
A.2 Summary statistics of sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.3 Trends in preference and identity variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.4 Regressions: further analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
List of Figures
1 Redistribution - cohort trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Redistribution - time trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 National pride - cohort trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 National pride - time trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Conﬁdence in the EU - cohort trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6 Conﬁdence in the EU - time trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1 Preference for redistribution across interview years . . . . . . . . 35
A.2 Preference for redistribution across survey waves . . . . . . . . . 35
A.3 National pride across interview years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.4 National pride across survey waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.5 Conﬁdence in the EU across interview years . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.6 Conﬁdence in the EU across survey waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
List of Tables
1 OLS baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 IV baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Redistribution binarised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Additional instruments I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Additional instruments II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Additional covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1 Summary statistics by country and year I . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.2 Summary statistics by country and year II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.3 Summary statistics: survey waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.4 Summary statistics: attitudes towards redistribution . . . . . . . 34
A.5 Summary statistics: national pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.6 Summary statistics: conﬁdence in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.7 Summary statistics: adoption of euro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.8 Subsample analysis age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A.9 Subsample analysis income groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.10 Subsample analysis: gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A.11 Additional main regressors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.12 Cohort eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.13 Interaction of proud with income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.14 Additional instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.15 OLS - full sample of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.16 IV - full sample of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1 Introduction
We still know relatively little about what shapes preferences for redistribu-
tion. The standard political economy theory of redistribution (Meltzer and
Richard 1981, Romer 1975), linking the expansion of gross income inequality
to increased demands for redistribution, has not been consistently validated in
practice (Georgiadis and Manning 2012, Gouveia and Masia 1998). Other ex-
planations focus on the presence of biased perceptions of redistribution,1 the
expectations of oﬀspring social mobility (Benabou and Ok 2001), the inﬂuence
of ethnic fractionalisation (Alesina et al. 2001) or the role of genetics.2
Here we focus on the inﬂuence of social identity on preferences for redistri-
bution, that is, the presence of common reference points (prescriptions) acting
as social norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) which inﬂuence behaviour within
the social group; the identity mechanism then confers some sense of social sol-
idarity on the members of the group. If identity plays this role and solidarity
is determined within the context of the nation, a move from that setting to
another will aﬀect people's preferences for redistribution. However, it may be
that the development of a European identity aﬀects the extent of solidarity and
individual experiences within a wider community. The move from the default
of national solidarity expression may be pro-redistributive.
Identity might contribute to the development of cognitive biases insofar as
a person's reference group is not the whole population but that of his group, or
his country. People in relatively rich countries may perceive themselves as being
poorer than they really are, not so much because of an information bias, but
because their reference point is based on the social group they identify with, and
not necessarily the whole population. So an important question for empirical
purposes is that of identifying whether an exogenous change in reference point,
such as the relevant spatial dimension of identity (Europe v national) , exerts
an inﬂuence on distributional preferences. Ignoring identity and relying on an
individualistic model of self-interested demand for redistribution will underesti-
mate the beneﬁts of redistribution itself.3 Processes of regional integration oﬀer
a unique natural experiment to examine such a question in the ﬁeld.
Social identities shape individuals' preferences by deﬁning a sense of be-
longing to a club good that appears in people's utility functions (Akerlof 1997).
Accordingly, an individual suﬀers disutility from deviating from his or her cat-
egory norms, which induces behaviour that conforms to those norms (Akerlof
and Kranton 2000). The extent to which identity inﬂuences preferences has
1It is common to ﬁnd some disconnect between how preferences are perceived and true
distribution of wealth and income. Norton and Ariely (2011) ﬁnd that perceptions of wealth
distribution do not correspond to real wealth distribution in the US. Reducing the information
bias that individuals have with regards to their position in the income distribution inﬂuences
redistributive preferences (Cruces et al. 2013).
2Zakharov and Ponarin (2013) examined data from redistribution in Russian regions and
ﬁnd that individuals with similar genetic makeup (L allele) systematically prefer more redis-
tribution.
3Carlsson et al. (2014) ﬁnd that pro-social preferences are stable over time. in an experi-
mental setting.
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wide-ranging implications for welfare economics:4 feeling part of a group trig-
gers more positive social evaluation towards the group (Cremer and Vugt 1999,
Gaertner et al. 1989). The substitution of a national currency by a common
currency (the euro) may have triggered some salience to the European project
resulting in a greater weight of the European component of people's identity;
at the same time identity may remain highly valued as a position good, espe-
cially for European countries that did not enjoy the club status with their own
national attachments. Identiﬁcation with a polity largely depends on the status
of the groups compared to the alternative possible status (Roccas 2003).
Our focus in this paper is on individuals' redistributive preferences, and
we claim that the development of a European identity resulting from institu-
tional reforms such as the introduction of a common currency provides quasi-
experimental evidence to examine it. Europe is the ideal setting to study
changes in identity, given that the progressive integration process exerts eﬀects
on welfare-state institutions, which in turn can inﬂuence the existing welfare
institutions by aﬀecting people's redistributive preferences. The unique expe-
rience of the setting up of a single currency exerted a non-neutral eﬀect on
European attachment as measured by conﬁdence in the EU, and reduced na-
tional pride. This result is consistent with other ﬁndings that indicate that
European identity explains satisfaction with democracy (Hobolt 2012). Simi-
larly, Risse (2010) ﬁnds that people who identify themselves as European are
more likely to identify with the values of tolerance and democracy.
The intuition behind the paper is that, when identity is deﬁned by a broader
other, people are more likely to express a preference for true redistribution
(redistribution in small communities might be partially explained by exchange
motivations instead). Becoming part of the Eurozone club in a setting where
redistribution is primarily undertaken by national welfare states should not
change the individual's expectation of beneﬁting from redistribution, and should
primarily aﬀect the rescaling of people's spatial identity. However, there is a
potential reverse causality that should be taken into account: a revival of anti-
European nationalism (which we proxy here by national pride) is underpinned
by anti-immigration attitudes; also there might be a problem with omitted-
variable bias if some confounding variables correlated with identity. In this
paper we propose an instrumental-variable strategy that takes advantage of the
adoption of a common currency (a largely exogenous decision to individuals
themselves). We focus on countries that adopted the common currency only
after its inception so that we can observe a period before and after being part
of the common currency. We use other instruments to measure the robustness
of our results. Finally, we use diﬀerent subsamples to ascertain whether the
results hold beyond the speciﬁc country sample.
Our paper brings together diﬀerent strands of the literature. We incorporate
some ﬁndings from the European politics literature suggesting that some aspects
of national identity are substituted for, with the expansion of European identity.
4Social identity has been suggested to reduce altruism and redistribution (Luttmer 2001,
Shayo 2009, Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015).
2
This not only changes people's aﬃliations but also preferences towards equality.
In a more competitive setting, such as that of a wider European Union, wide
inequalities are likely to emerge and so the role of redistributive mechanisms
becomes more important. We contribute to the literature on preference for re-
distribution and the limitations of the Meltzer and Richard approach. Third,
the paper contributes to the role of identity in inﬂuencing economic behaviour
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005). If changes in institutions aﬀect people's
preferences by changing their identiﬁcation and collective aﬃliations then pol-
icy needs to be focused more strongly on such indirect eﬀects. Finally, this paper
extends the ﬁndings of Luttmer (2001), suggesting that preferences for redistri-
bution change with the share of the poor in a region, as Eurozone enlargement
to central and Eastern Europe might have exerted an impact on preferences
for redistribution. However, we argue that the mechanism for such an eﬀect is
channelled through identity.
Section 2 provides the background to the analysis of this paper. Section
3 describes the data and methods, section 4 presents results and the paper
concludes with section 5.
2 Background
There are two important branches of the economics literature that connect to the
approach that we use in this paper: the literature on redistributive preferences
and the literature on the economics of identity.
2.1 Preferences for redistribution
Economic approaches to redistribution such as Meltzer and Richard (1981) typ-
ically assume that people's position in society determines their preferences5 and
often disregard how people's social groupings inﬂuence preferences. But group-
ings are important: for example, ethnically diverse societies exhibit less class
conﬂict or, if they do, it is more rare as ethnicity or identity add additional di-
mension to the political spectrum away from purely economic or redistributive
questions (Lee and Roemer 2006).
In the last twenty years we have seen an increasing interest in examining how
multiculturalism and diversity inﬂuence preferences for redistribution. Alesina
et al. (2001) ﬁnd that ethnic fractionalisation exerts an inﬂuence on redis-
tributive preferences in the context of the United States where the default is
not a consolidated welfare state as in Europe. Luttmer (2001) ﬁnds a nega-
tive relationship between diversity and preferences for redistribution: people's
preferences for redistribution are interdependent in the sense that preference
is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of other individuals around them. People
appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups they identify with, be
5By preferences for redistribution we mean the generalized support for the transfer of
resources to ex-ante undetermined individuals by a set of mechanisms that include taxation,
welfare policies and other
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that identiﬁcation based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, region or
something else.
Preferences for redistribution have been found to be related to voting be-
haviour and political ideology,6 to people's own self-interest, 7 to their evaluation
of inequalities,8 and to their perceptions of the leaky bucket, the eﬃciency of
the transfer mechanism (Krawczyk 2010).
Furthermore, redistributive preferences may reﬂect cultural diﬀerences (Luttmer
and Singhal 2011) and political diﬀerences.9 But these diﬀerences are not ex-
ogenous or immutable and may be associated with the phenomenon of identity.
2.2 Identity
Identity refers to mechanisms through which individuals become attached to
each other by creating a sense of belonging (Tajfel 1978). Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) consider identity as an externality on people's actions triggered by the
presence of common social norms: these are common reference points that can
shift over time. Collective identities are the expressions of diﬀerent cultures
which can be an important source of preference endogeneity (Bowles 1998) and
a recent survey suggests that they can explain individuals' solidarity attitudes
(Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015). People may alter their behaviour to conform to
other people's expectations and social norms (Asch 1951) beyond their narrow
personal self-interest.10
Social identity can have inward eﬀects on the person, and an outward eﬀect
on the group (Mayer and Palmowski 2004). Clearly a person may be associated
with multiple groups and, as a result, reveal multiple identities  for example
regional and European identities. Some identities attributed to a person may
conﬂict with each other and even become oppositional (Battu and Zenou 2010),
but others may not.
Identities have been seen as a multidimensional social categorization that
can be primed by certain circumstances or events. Easton (1975) distinguishes
instrumental and aﬀective support for political institutions. If an institution
is perceived as being instrumentally beneﬁcial, the attachment to that insti-
tution would be expected to increase. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) have put
6Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) ﬁnd evidence that experiencing a recession during early
adulthood aﬀects preferences for redistribution.
7Durante et al. (2014) conducted a laboratory study to test for the role of redistribution,
risk aversion and social preferences as drivers of preferences for redistribution, ﬁnding evidence
of all of them but with a stronger eﬀect for self-interest.
8Fong and Luttmer (2011) ﬁnd that the source of inequality matters.
9For example, countries under socialism exhibited higher redistributive preferences (Corneo
and Grüner 2002).
10Klor and Shayo (2010) ﬁnd experimental evidence that when individual sacriﬁce was not
too high, they accommodate their preferences to those of the group. Charness et al. (2007)
and Chen and Li (2009) show that individuals are altruistic towards the people that belong
to the group they identify themselves with. Lindqvist and Östling (2013) ﬁnd that in low tax
countries some share of the poor identify with their ethnicity and favour low taxes; ethnically
homogenous societies exhibit more redistribution.
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forward the theory of cognitive mobilization whereby education exerts an eﬀect
on individuals' cosmopolitan identity.
Consider the connection with redistributive preferences discussed in section
2.1. National or social identity can act as a social tie, which in turn operates
in enhancing support for the welfare state (Costa-i-Font and Cowell 2015).11
Redistribution is one of the central features of welfare states: maintenance of re-
distributive institutions largely depends on individual support for taxing higher
incomes more heavily and targeting expenditures to social need. Since such
activities are typically associated with nations, the question arises whether sup-
port for redistributive institutions and programs varies with the rescaling of
individuals' identities to both supranational and subnational bodies.
Clearly this is of particular interest with reference to a supranational organ-
isation such as the European Union.
2.3 European identity
In principle European identity could play a role similar to that of American
identity, uniting people by transcending borders, and especially racial divisions
(Transue 2007). A superordinate identity eliminates the eﬀects of parochial-
ism, country nationalism and group identity. The European project certainly
raises interesting questions in connection with the mechanisms of redistribution
and perceptions of identity. With European integration, the eﬃcient level of
redistribution scales up to the European rather than the country level (Casella
and Frey 1992) and is likely to change the strength of people's attachments to
state sovereignty as the institutions in member countries become locked into
this emerging structure (Eichengreen 2008).
The rise of a European common identity acts on people's attitudes as a pro-
redistributive force that confronts the existence of own-nationality bias (Lowes
et al. 2015). This is, perhaps, to be expected as spatial identities are potentially
rescaled from solely national to the supranational, European, level. However,
within this structure there is a variety of identities  national, regional, European
 and we know little about the relations between these identities, whether they
are complementary, substitute or independent. So it is not clear a priori whether
the priming of an identity (as mentioned in section 2.2) would exert an external
eﬀect on others.
However, among the variety of priming events that might be considered rele-
vant, one of the most important would be the setting up of a common currency.
The introduction of a single currency encompasses the reduction of one of the
most important old symbols of national identity; so one should expect it to
exert an inﬂuence on people's identiﬁcation: the euro exempliﬁes the strategy
of burning one's boats. For many countries joining the euro club has meant a
way to improving their status worldwide, and hence it implied positive social
11However, the underpinning mechanisms for the tying eﬀect are still not well known. For
instance, some research in political science argues that the strengthening support of Canadian
national identity lies in the eﬀect the welfare state has had in building national identity, and
not the other way round (Johnston et al. 2010).
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externality. Support for the euro has remained stable, even through the re-
cent crisis;12 but whether such (largely exogenous) externality leads to stronger
preference for redistribution is an empirical question.
2.4 Our approach
In this paper we take advantage of an institutional reform, the adoption of the
single currency, which we argue has had a symbolic eﬀect on priming Euro-
pean identity. The introduction of the euro and its eﬀects when the national
currencies were eﬀectively replaced would be expected to have had an eﬀect
on attitudes and preferences. We can test whether that eﬀect was stronger for
countries that joined the euro initially than for the rest.
But capturing identity empirically is not a simple task. Most studies rely
on survey questions which identify some component of a latent European iden-
tity. Some evidence ﬁnds that the stronger is the feeling of national identity,
the weaker is support for the European Union (Carey 2002). So here we use both
national pride and conﬁdence in the European Union to proxy the underlying
European identity. Our identiﬁcation strategy hinges on taking advantage of
cross-country variation in preferences and collective identiﬁcation (social iden-
tity) over time. A key challenge is to control for potential omitted variables.
Indeed, cohort eﬀects are important because individuals of the same cohort
share similar experiences and observable similar constraints.
Given that our results are aﬀected by a number of potential individual char-
acteristics, we look at the presence of heterogeneous eﬀects and subsample anal-
ysis and robustness checks such as examining the role of additional instruments
(such as years of citizenship education to instrument European Union conﬁdence
and medals in the Olympic games to instrument national pride, as well as peer
eﬀects).
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
Our primary dataset on preference for redistribution and identity is the Eu-
ropean sample of the World Values Survey, also known as European Values
Survey for the period 19812014. The dataset provides with a series of repeated
cross sections observations on the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values
12This is in contrast to trust in European institutions generally, which has fallen. Guiso et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that the main determinants of positive sentiment towards the EU is the quality
of government, and develop an argument on institutional arbitrage: the change in support to
EU integration is determined by a change in support for the single market and the change
in support for a single currency. Positive sentiments towards the EU are primarily aﬀected
negatively by unemployment and the enlargement post 2004 in Southern European countries.
Education, age, gender, and the socio-economic status of individuals have consistently been
found to be salient contributors to individuals' support for the EU. Age, income, occupation,
and political values are not merely controls in this analysis but rather contribute to individuals'
cognitive development and thus understanding of the EU project (Inglehart et al. 1991).
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and opinions of citizens all over Europe. We have employed records of indi-
vidual speciﬁc redistributive preferences, alongside rich measures of spatial or
geographic identity that are recorded in the European Values Survey. Speciﬁ-
cally, we use self-reported measures of individual's preference for redistribution,
which have been validated in previous studies.13
We focus on a set of countries that joined the European Union after 2004.
Not all countries are covered in each survey wave, but the years range from
1981 to 2014 (for details see the summary statistics in the Appendix). Overall
we are left with a fairly large sample of 27,376 respondents. There are several
advantages of using such a sample. First, it allows one to identify the eﬀect
of joining the common currency (adopting the euro), in contrast to using the
total sample of European Union countries; the founding countries of the euro
substituted the currency almost at the same time and hence there is not enough
variability to exploit.14 The second advantage of using a sample of those that
joined the euro after 2004 is that there is likely to be an attraction for joining
the euro club (institutional arbitrage in the spirit of Guiso et al. 2014) which
plays out in terms of boosting European identity and hence widening the spatial
identity beyond the national reach. Finally the introduction of the common
currency was an unexpected eﬀect within the time frame of the survey questions
(4-6 years), and so it is unlikely that anticipation eﬀects (on the ﬁnal success of
an economy in joining a common currency) could threaten the identiﬁcation of
the eﬀect on spatial identity.
EVS: Key Questions
A. Redistributive Preferences
Rate your agreement on this scale: 1. Incomes should be made more equal
...
10. We need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for eﬀort
B. National Pride
How proud are you to be X? [Very proud, Quite Proud, Not very Proud, Not at all Proud]
C. Conﬁdence in the EU
I am going to name a number of EU organisations... [Great deal of conﬁdence, quite a lot of conﬁdence,
...how much conﬁdence [do] you have in them? ...not very much conﬁdence, none at all]
As noted, the redistributive preference question is extensively used in the lit-
erature, and refers to a general question about redistribution without specifying
the level of authority responsible to make incomes more equal. This way, it can
be argued to be institutionally neutral. By contrast, national pride relates to
restricted loyalties to national groups which depend on the perceptions of status
of national communities. Hence, in this paper we hypothesize that becoming
13Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that redistributive preferences correlate in the
expected way with political leanings.
14In addition, exchange rates were pegged from 1999 and hence, the eﬀect of the common
currency was already expected and discounted for in such a broader sample.
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fully part of a larger community (for example by joining the euro area) would
be expected to weaken the eﬀect of national pride. Finally, we use conﬁdence
in the European Union. This is a diﬀerent question from trust in the working
of European institutions: it captures in a multi-question format the perceptions
of individuals in post-2004 European countries of their degree of attachment to
the European Union. This question has been found to correlate well with other
attitudes towards Europe in the sample.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show the samples and countries included
in the dataset alongside the main sample characteristics such as the average
age, the percentage of women, education attainment, family characteristics and
size and political aﬃliation. The sample size of each country is about 1000
respondents. Table A.3 displays the sample size of the survey waves which is
larger for 1991-98 than the rest. Tables A.4 to A.6 show the distribution of
the main study variables and Table A.7 the proportion of countries that have
adopted the euro in the total sample (13%).
3.2 The Empirical Strategy
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on selecting a sample of countries that have
progressively joined the European Union for which we can identify a period
before and a period after they adopt the euro as a currency. In doing so, it
is important to understand how diﬀerent this subsample of countries is from
the rest of the European Union member states. Figures A.1 to A.6 (in Section
A.3 of the Appendix) provide plots of our variable of interest (preferences for
redistribution) and identity variables for the subgroup of countries that joined
the EU after 2004 and those that joined before. In each case there appears
to be little diﬀerence between the values in the two subsamples when plotted
across interview years, but there appears to be evidence of convergence when
we plot over sample waves. We may conclude that examining the subsample
of countries is likely to allow us to identify the eﬀect of an identity change in
redistributive preferences.
Perhaps the most obvious problem in examining the eﬀect of identity on re-
distributive preferences is the endogeneity of identity measures, and speciﬁcally
the possibility of reverse causality whereby identity could be viewed as the ef-
fect of the existence of redistributive institutions. Furthermore, there might be
unobservable variables that intermediate the association between identity and
redistributive preferences. In order to account for the non-random changes in
identity, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that exploits the exoge-
nous variation of a key institutional change, namely the introduction of the euro,
which does not directly aﬀect redistributive preferences unless it is by chang-
ing people's identiﬁcation with Europe (the excludability condition). We also
test for the so-called monotonicity condition to test whether the introduction
of the euro did indeed aﬀect identity in the expected sign and that the eﬀect is
strong (relevance condition) which is generally observed by examining the joint
signiﬁcance of ﬁrst-stage estimates in a 2SLS (Staiger's condition).
Our IV strategy identiﬁes the local average eﬀects of the impact of identity
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changes resulting from the introduction of a common currency. In addition, we
employ a battery of other instruments to examine whether the sign comparisons
and results are equally robust. Finally, we undertake some placebo tests to make
sure our results are not spurious.
We have estimated reduced forms of the eﬀect of identity on redistributive
preferences. Our identiﬁcation rests on a combination of cross-sectional, time
and cohort variation. In some speciﬁcations we run cohort-speciﬁc regressions to
examine the potential cohort-speciﬁc eﬀects. Country and time-speciﬁc trends
are controlled for, as they could be driving the results. The regression strategy
includes a quadratic trend to control for all those macroeconomic factors that
are time varying and exhibit a trend in time. Other country-speciﬁc time factors
are expected to be captured by country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The total number of observations is 27,376. Our main dependent variable
refers to redistributive preferences measured as before. Our treatment variable
of interest refers to the two variables capturing the eﬀect of identity, namely na-
tional pride and conﬁdence in the EU. We include a long list of controls including
demographics, income and socioeconomic, household size and employment sta-
tus and we identify whether individual are immigrants to the country. The
omitted categories in the regressions are male, elementary or lower education,
all other marital statuses, no children, all other employment statuses and no
immigrant status.
4 Results
4.1 Preliminary Evidence
Figures 1 and 2 provide data on the cohort and time trends on preference for
redistribution in the sample of countries examined in this study. The cohort
trend indicates that those individuals over 55 are more likely to support re-
distribution. Importantly, redistributive preferences have progressively become
more salient in people's attitudes in recent survey waves. This eﬀect is not just
an artifact of the most recent wave.
Figures 3 and 4 examine similar trends in national pride indicating an age
component to it, which is in line with the hypothesis of Europeanisation as re-
ducing national pride: Europeanisation may have reduced national attachment.
Some research ﬁnds time trend identiﬁcation with Europe in EU countries (Flig-
stein et al. 2012), but identiﬁcation appears to be largely dependent on the eco-
nomic performance of Europe, particularly unemployment (Guiso et al. 2014).
Some recent evidence ﬁnds that Eastern European countries exhibited a compa-
rable or even higher identiﬁcation with Europe which is in large part explained
by the large minority groups in many of those European member states.
Figures 5 and 6 examine cohort and time trends on EU conﬁdence. Measur-
ing the importance of conﬁdence in the EU is important, because being Euro-
pean can mean diﬀerent things across countries whilst conﬁdence with the EU is
a commonly accepted construct. Interestingly cohort trends show that younger
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Figure 1: Redistribution - cohort trend
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Note: Figure shows attitudes towards redistribution for diﬀerent age groups, with 1 being we need
larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort and 10 being incomes should be made
more equal. Data are from the sample of countries which joined the European Union after 2003
(responses shown in percent, n=25,216).
Figure 2: Redistribution - time trend
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Note: Figure shows attitudes towards redistribution for diﬀerent survey waves, with 1 being we
need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort and 10 being incomes should be
made more equal. Data are from the sample of countries which joined the European Union after
2003 (responses shown in percent, n=25,216).
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Figure 3: National pride - cohort trend
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Note: Figure shows responses to the question How proud are you to be [nationality]? for diﬀerent
survey waves. Data are from the sample of countries which joined the European Union after 2003
(responses shown in percent, n=26,025).
Figure 4: National pride - time trend
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Note: Figure shows responses to the question How proud are you to be [nationality]? for diﬀerent
age groups. Data are from the sample of countries which joined the European Union after 2003
(responses shown in percent, n=26,025).
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Figure 5: Conﬁdence in the EU - cohort trend
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Note: Figure shows responses to the question Could you tell me how much conﬁdence you have
in [the European Union]? for diﬀerent age groups. Data are from the sample of countries which
joined the European Union after 2003 (responses shown in percent, n=20,795).
cohorts are more likely to identify with Europe, exactly the opposite trend to
that of national pride. In contrast, we ﬁnd that time trends suggest a slight
reduction in EU conﬁdence. This result is consistent with the idea advanced
by Fligstein et al. (2012), that European identity is a class-based phenomenon
directly linked to the transnational mobility beneﬁts of the common EU mar-
ket. However, the rise of European identity might be the eﬀect of educational
attainment and increasing cultural interconnection. To disentangle such eﬀect
we need additional regression analysis.
4.2 Baseline results
Speciﬁcations
Our baseline speciﬁcation is the following:
Ritr = γ0 + γ1Iitr + γ2Xitr + γ3yitr + δr + θt + itr
where Ritr refers to the preference-for-redistribution response by an individ-
ual i, interviewed at time t and in country r. The variable Iitr refers to a
variable indicating individuals' European identity, measured as the individual
identiﬁcation with their country (national pride) or Europe (conﬁdence in the
European Union). All speciﬁcations include a vector of individual characteris-
tics Xitr which includes age, gender, schooling, civil status, size of the area of
residence;15 yitr is included to control for changes in income à la Meltzer and
15Although the notation allows for individual i, interviewed at time t and in country r some
of these characteristics are time-invariant.
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Figure 6: Conﬁdence in the EU - time trend
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Note: Figure shows responses to the question Could you tell me how much conﬁdence you have in
[the European Union]? for diﬀerent survey waves. Data are from the sample of countries which
joined the European Union after 2003 (responses shown in percent, n=20,795).
Richard as well as unemployment as potentially driving the results; δr refers to
country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for common background of individuals residing in
each country, θt refers to a wave- (time-) speciﬁc eﬀect to control for age-speciﬁc
trends in redistributive preferences and itr is a random term.
In order to estimate the 2SLS equation we employ a ﬁrst-stage equation
capturing the impact of the proposed instrument on the identity questions:
Iitr = α0 + α1eurotr + α2Xi + α3Zi + µitr
where euro refers to a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country r has
adopted the common currency at time t and a vector of individual characteristics
(Zi). As a rule-of-thumb the F-test of such a ﬁrst regression should exceed
the value 10 for the instrument to be strong enough to meet the relevance
condition. In addition, the excludability condition refers to the absence of a
correlation between the error term and the instrument. This condition cannot
be tested empirically, but we do address some issues concerning this assumption
by testing the eﬀects of alternative instruments that follow a similar rationale,
and examining diﬀerent of suggestive evidence on its plausibility.
All regressions have been estimated using OLS to ease the interpretation of
coeﬃcients, and robustness checks include speciﬁcations using alternative tech-
niques dealing with the categorical nature of the data, including a binarised
identity and redistributive preference variable so as to interpret the dependent
variable as a probability. Robust standard errors are clustered at the coun-
try level and descriptive statistics are provided in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the
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Appendix.
Baseline regressions
Table 1 reports the regression results to explain redistributive preferences by
change in national pride and EU conﬁdence. These are OLS results that do not
take into account all the potential problems of reverse causality and omitted-
variable bias. We provide diﬀerent speciﬁcations with diﬀerent controls and
the beta coeﬃcients to interpret the results as the eﬀects of a one-standard-
deviation change. The eﬀects of income are as expected, indicated by a negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
A one-standard-deviation increase in national pride is found to reduce redis-
tributive preferences by the same magnitude (6%) as a one-standard-deviation
increase in income. As expected, younger individuals are more likely to support
redistribution. A one-standard-deviation increase in the population in tertiary
education reduces preferences for redistribution by 13%. So the eﬀect of educa-
tion appears to be twice the size of the eﬀect of income. This is an important
result, given the focus in the literature on the Meltzer and Richard type of ap-
proach. Indeed, this coeﬃcient is important as it can explain why the income
ranking of the median voter would not exert the predicted inﬂuence. Initially,
Columns (1) and (6) report only the coeﬃcient for national pride and conﬁdence
in the EU respectively. The regressions contained in columns (2) and (7) report
the eﬀect after the introduction of a quadratic time trend to account for poten-
tial underlying trends that could be driving the coeﬃcients. Columns (3) and
(8) contain the eﬀect of adding additional controls for income and employment,
and ﬁnally Columns (4) and (9) contain the eﬀect resulting from the additional
control for town size. All regressions contain country ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, the
coeﬃcients for national pride exhibit little variation in its size. Importantly,
unemployment which is a variable that is found to explain European identiﬁ-
cation and trust in European institutions (Guiso et al. 2014) does not exert
an inﬂuence on preferences for redistribution. From all the covariates reported
here the most important determinant of redistributive preferences appears to
be education.
Table 2 reports a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) analysis that controls for
reverse causality and unobservables. Now conﬁdence in the EU switches its
coeﬃcient to being positive and signiﬁcant and exhibits the same coeﬃcient
size but with the opposite sign to that of national pride (both are statistically
signiﬁcant). Again, the eﬀect's size indicates that one standard deviation of
national pride reduces preferences for redistribution by an amount similar in
size (but opposite in sign) to that of an increase in conﬁdence in the EU. Tests
all reject the hypothesis of exogeneity, and the F-test of the ﬁrst stage regression
both exceed 10 suggesting that instruments are not weak. Furthermore, the
instrument (join the euro) exhibits the expected sign. As expected, looking
at the ﬁrst stage regression we ﬁnd that women, older individuals, married and
people without tertiary education, unemployed and from smaller towns are more
14
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likely to exhibit national pride.
As expected the coeﬃcient for tertiary education remains strongly signif-
icant and negatively associated with redistributive preferences. Interestingly,
income and tertiary education have an opposite eﬀect on national pride. Again
all regressions control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. Some important diﬀerences
across speciﬁcations when national pride and conﬁdence in the EU are esti-
mated refer to the eﬀect of age, which only the eﬀect of age squared turns out
to be signiﬁcant when explaining national pride. In contrast, age exhibits a
reverse nonlinear eﬀect in explaining conﬁdence in the EU and redistributive
preferences. The pattern of coeﬃcients in Table 2 remains in Table 3 when
redistributive preferences are binarised. The interpretation is that the probabil-
ity of supporting redistribution declines by 2.5% if individuals exhibit national
pride, and increases by the same magnitude if they have conﬁdence in the EU.
Tables A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix show that this eﬀect is primarily driven by
older-age and low-income individuals. On this basis we can conclude that the
the instrumental strategy we employ appears to provide consistent and robust
results, given that alternative instruments provide similar results.
4.3 Robustness checks
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression estimates using diﬀerent instruments. In
Table 4 we use alternative instruments of EU conﬁdence such as a dummy in-
dicating whether the country has joined the EU, average conﬁdence in the EU
(of other countries in the sample) to predict conﬁdence and average pride (of
other countries in the sample) to predict pride. The exogeneity and F tests
coeﬃcients all suggest they are not weak instruments and the coeﬃcients are all
exhibiting the same sign although vary in terms of the impact. An expansion
of EU conﬁdence exerts a larger positive eﬀect now than the negative eﬀects
of national pride. Then in Table 5 we examine other instruments such as the
duration of citizenship education, which turns out to be a weak instrument,
and the number of medals in the Olympics games which was a strong instru-
ment for national pride and results in the IV analysis showing a signiﬁcant and
comparable coeﬃcient as in other regressions estimates.
Table 6 shows that the estimates predicting redistributive preferences are
robust to the inclusion of political preferences. As before, the inclusion of dif-
ferent instruments suggests the same reverse-sign eﬀect in the coeﬃcient for EU
conﬁdence which now turns positive when including the political control in the
estimates with the alternative instruments used in Table 5. As expected, the
more to the right an individual positions himself the less likely he is to support
redistribution. All estimates exhibit an important nonlinear trend which cap-
tures among other aﬀects that of time-varying macroeconomic and contextual
eﬀects.
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Table 2: IV baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable proud redistribution confeu redistribution
joineuro -0.127*** 0.119***
(0.0304) (0.0366)
proud -15.58***
(3.788)
confeu 16.49***
(5.242)
age -0.000967 0.00607 -0.0152*** 0.277***
(0.00227) (0.0359) (0.00260) (0.0907)
age2 7.73e-05*** 0.00109** 0.000150*** -0.00265***
(2.23e-05) (0.000461) (2.60e-05) (0.000900)
female 0.0473*** 0.794*** -0.0236* 0.411
(0.0120) (0.260) (0.0137) (0.265)
secondary incomplete -0.00933 -0.680** 0.0136 -0.695
(0.0217) (0.341) (0.0269) (0.459)
secondary -0.0263 -0.909*** 0.00447 -0.506
(0.0183) (0.298) (0.0228) (0.387)
tertiary -0.0808*** -2.183*** 0.0630** -1.885***
(0.0216) (0.444) (0.0254) (0.524)
married 0.0465*** 0.802*** -0.00880 0.216
(0.0152) (0.292) (0.0173) (0.298)
Dchildren -0.0220 -0.566* 0.0160 -0.493
(0.0195) (0.315) (0.0221) (0.384)
income 0.00935*** 0.0606 0.0335*** -0.638***
(0.00307) (0.0603) (0.00347) (0.184)
unemployed -0.110*** -1.568*** -0.0492* 0.913*
(0.0246) (0.568) (0.0266) (0.521)
townsize -0.0234*** -0.404*** 0.0126*** -0.239***
(0.00255) (0.0972) (0.00283) (0.0829)
wave -0.356*** -2.863** 0.268*** -1.544
(0.0786) (1.230) (0.0959) (1.419)
wave2 0.0367*** 0.288** -0.0367*** 0.307*
(0.00874) (0.126) (0.0107) (0.165)
Constant 3.989*** 62.00*** 2.427*** -40.93***
(0.173) (13.94) (0.213) (14.90)
Country FE x x x x
Observations 15,904 15,904 14,997 14,997
R-squared 0.117 -14.693 0.045 -21.308
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 15880) = 17.58 F( 1, 14973) = 10.54
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0012
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
238.875 238.148
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
Note: Table shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression. The instrument is
the binary variable joineuro, taking a value of 1 if the country is part of the euro currency in the
respective year. Columns (1) and (2) use national pride as the instrumented variable, columns (3)
and (4) use conﬁdence in the EU as the instrumented variable. The dependent variable redistribution
takes values from 1 (we need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort) to 10
(incomes should be made more equal).
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Table 3: Redistribution binarised
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable proud redistribution_binary confeu redistribution_binary
joineuro -0.127*** 0.119***
(0.0304) (0.0366)
proud -2.416***
(0.589)
confeu 2.568***
(0.816)
Country FE x x x x
Observations 15904 15904 14997 14997
R-squared 0.117 -12.486 0.045 -18.217
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 15880) = 17.58 F( 1, 14973) = 10.54
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0012
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
221.336 221.036
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
Note: Table shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression. The instrument is
the binary variable joineuro, taking a value of 1 if the country is part of the euro currency in the
respective year. Columns (1) and (2) use national pride as the instrumented variable, columns (3)
and (4) use conﬁdence in the EU as the instrumented variable; redistribution_binary=0 if attitude
towards redistribution between 1 and 5, and =1 if attitude towards redistribution between 6 and
10, with 1 being we need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort and 10 being
incomes should be made more equal; independent variables included are: age, age squared, female,
secondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave,
and wave squared.
18
Table 4: Additional instruments I
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Table 6: Additional covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV 1st stage IV 2nd stage IV 1st stage IV 2nd stage
Dependent variable redistribution redistribution proud redistribution confeu redistribution
joineuro -0.0859** 0.134***
(0.0349) (0.0421)
proud -0.185*** -19.36**
(0.0331) (7.977)
confeu -0.199*** 12.16***
(0.0319) (4.029)
age 0.0276*** 0.0273*** -0.00276 -0.0267 -0.0167*** 0.233***
(0.00927) (0.00952) (0.00263) (0.0563) (0.00299) (0.0772)
age2 -0.000171* -0.000183* 9.40e-05*** 0.00165* 0.000170*** -0.00227***
(0.0000931) (0.0000961) (0.0000261) (0.000918) (0.0000301) (0.000783)
female 0.027 0.00196 0.0435*** 0.864** -0.0149 0.188
(0.0491) (0.0498) (0.0134) (0.435) (0.0152) (0.204)
secondary_incomplete -0.457*** -0.439*** 0.0021 -0.404 -0.00412 -0.372
(0.0998) (0.103) (0.0252) (0.491) (0.0308) (0.394)
secondary -0.483*** -0.461*** -0.016 -0.758* -0.0237 -0.134
(0.0833) (0.0861) (0.0215) (0.434) (0.0265) (0.359)
tertiary -0.971*** -0.925*** -0.0729*** -2.331*** 0.0393 -1.366***
(0.0917) (0.0936) (0.0246) (0.741) (0.0291) (0.394)
married 0.0791 0.0455 0.0492*** 1.013** -0.00506 0.0989
(0.0621) (0.0632) (0.0174) (0.509) (0.0194) (0.25)
Dchildren -0.237*** -0.234*** -0.0173 -0.541 0.0105 -0.333
(0.0774) (0.0787) (0.0222) (0.446) (0.0246) (0.316)
income -0.0779*** -0.0725*** 0.00639* 0.0498 0.0336*** -0.483***
(0.0129) (0.0131) (0.00348) (0.0862) (0.00389) (0.143)
unemployed 0.088 0.0519 -0.0900*** -1.643* -0.0504* 0.67
(0.0965) (0.0981) (0.0272) (0.894) (0.0301) (0.437)
townsize -0.0215** -0.00878 -0.0220*** -0.446** 0.0104*** -0.140**
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.00287) (0.185) (0.00314) (0.0591)
leftright -0.118*** -0.112*** 0.0180*** 0.228 0.0115*** -0.255***
(0.012) (0.0122) (0.00298) (0.156) (0.0035) (0.0649)
wave -1.074*** -0.917*** -0.255*** -3.447* 0.356*** -2.700**
(0.287) (0.292) (0.0923) (1.795) (0.109) (1.295)
wave2 0.156*** 0.144*** 0.0260** 0.357** -0.0456*** 0.398***
(0.0316) (0.032) (0.0103) (0.182) (0.0122) (0.15)
Constant 8.370*** 7.752*** 3.746*** 75.15*** 2.238*** -25.16**
(0.652) (0.667) (0.2) (28.04) (0.239) (10.94)
Country FE x x x x x x
Observations 12,452 12,030 12,452 12,452 12,030 12,030
R-squared 0.143 0.148 0.117 -23.507 0.042 -11.907
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments: F( 1, 12427) = 6.04 F( 1, 12005) = 10.12
Prob > F = 0.0140 Prob > F = 0.0015
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 131.197 131.175
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
Note: Shows the inclusion of the additional covariate leftright (self-positioning on political scale,
with 1 being left and 10 being right). Cols (1) and (2) show OLS regressions, cols (3) to (6) show the
1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression, with joineuro as the instrument; the main
regressors are national pride (cols (1), (3), and (4)) and conﬁdence in the EU (cols (2), (5), and
(6)); the dependent variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income diﬀerences
as incentives for individual eﬀort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal).
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5 Conclusion
The rescaling of spatial identity in the context of European integration processes
is potentially an important eﬀect underpinning changes in redistributive prefer-
ences. This paper has provided evidence to support that claim. However, unlike
previous research that mainly stresses the importance of group identity, we have
argued that the scale of geographical identiﬁcation matters. Speciﬁcally, the de-
velopment of a European identity appears to weaken national pride. But how
important is this new collective identity in shifting preferences for redistribu-
tion? The answer to this question could help to explain the limited evidence
of median-voter explanations for redistributive preferences. Indeed, in addition
to the information problems people face in identifying their position in the in-
come distribution, when making redistributive judgments, they appear to react
to change in the spatial scale of reference. So the expansion of the European
integration process together with the introduction of a common currency exerts
a non-neutral inﬂuence in the context that inﬂuences redistributive preferences.
This paper has speciﬁcally examined the eﬀects of spatial identity in those
countries that joined the EU after 2004 where we can identify the introduction
of reforms expanding European integration and the eﬀect of joining the single
currency. Unlike the case of the founding countries of the Eurozone we can iden-
tify the eﬀect of joining a European club more precisely using the recent-joiners
sample. We ﬁnd a positive (negative) impact of European identity (national
identity) on preferences for redistribution. The eﬀect of identity is comparable
in size to the eﬀect of income and is only exceeded by the eﬀect of tertiary
education.
These results indicate that institutional changes involving symbolic features
that deﬁne one's identity  in this case the currency  can exert an impact on
people's attachments, and more speciﬁcally can underpin the formation of a per-
son's identity. We ﬁnd robust evidence suggesting that the introduction of the
euro as a common currency in countries that joined the EU after 2004 increased
people's conﬁdence in the European Union, and reduced the importance of na-
tional pride. Similarly, this evidence is replicated when other potential identity
instruments are examined. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we ﬁnd that
the exogenous change in European identity resulting from a common currency,
increases people's preference for redistribution. These results are consistent with
the previous identity literature.16
Among the policy implications of these ﬁndings it appears that there are
important positive knock-on eﬀects on redistributive preferences associated with
furthering European integration. The lessening of national pride is more likely
to lead to changes in individuals' reference points which inﬂuence the way they
form preferences for redistribution.
16See Shayo (2009) and Costa-i-Font and Cowell (2015) for a review.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Summary characteristics
Country - year N Size of town N %
Bulgaria (1997) 1072 2,000 and less 6124 25.69
Bulgaria (2005) 1001 2,000-5,000 3570 14.98
Croatia (1996) 1196 5,000-10,000 1816 7.62
Cyprus (2006) 1050 10,000-20,000 1825 7.66
Cyprus (2011) 1000 20,000-50,000 2386 10.01
Czech Republic (1991) 924 50,000-100,000 1657 6.95
Estonia (1996) 1021 100,000-500,000 4234 17.76
Estonia (2011) 1533 500,000 and more 2226 9.34
Hungary (1982) 1464 Total 23838 100
Hungary (1998) 650
Hungary (2009) 1007
Latvia (1996) 1200
Lithuania (1997) 1009 Sex N %
Poland (1989) 938 Male 12731 46.54
Poland (1997) 1153 Female 14623 53.46
Poland (2005) 1000 Total 27354 100
Poland (2012) 966
Romania (1998) 1239
Romania (2005) 1776 Age N %
Romania (2012) 1503 15 to 24 3448 12.59
Slovakia (1990) 466 25 to 34 4694 17.15
Slovakia (1998) 1095 35 to 44 4878 17.82
Slovenia (1995) 1007 45 to 54 4539 16.58
Slovenia (2005) 1037 55 to 64 4109 15.01
Slovenia (2011) 1069 65 and over 5708 20.85
Total 27376 Total 27376 100
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Highest educational level attained N % Employment status N %
Incomplete elementary 1306 5.91 Full time 11712 44.94
Compulsory elementary education 3078 13.92 Part time 1001 3.84
Incomplete secondary : technical/vocational 1898 8.58 Self employed 1210 4.64
Complete secondary : technical/vocational 5473 24.75 Retired 6716 25.77
Incomplete secondary: university-prep 1382 6.25 Housewife 1731 6.64
Complete secondary: university-prepa 4030 18.23 Students 1407 5.40
University without degree 1453 6.57 Unemployed 1882 7.22
University with degree 3491 15.79 Other 402 1.54
Total 22111 100 Total 26061 100
Self positioning in political scale N % Income scale N %
Left 1132 5.65 Lowest step 2238 9.67
2 765 3.82 Second step 2421 10.46
3 1461 7.29 Third step 2924 12.64
4 1583 7.9 Fourth step 3275 14.15
5 6834 34.11 Fifth step 4342 18.76
6 2869 14.32 Sixth step 2870 12.40
7 1778 8.87 Seventh step 2210 9.55
8 1619 8.08 Eighth step 1450 6.27
9 711 3.55 Ninth step 825 3.57
Right 1284 6.41 Tenth step 585 2.53
Total 20036 100 Total 23140 100
A.1.2 Background information: Citizenship education
Source: Citizenship education in Europe
Available data (all for 2010/2011):
• Provision of a separate, compulsory subject focused on elements of citi-
zenship education, according to national curricula (ISCED17 1, 2 and 3),
2010/11
• Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated into other
subjects, by ages, according to national curricula, 2010/11
• Average minimum taught time devoted to citizenship education as a sep-
arate subject during a notional year, based on the recommendations for
primary, general (lower and upper) secondary education, 2010/11
Some information on the concept of citizenship education: The civic compe-
tences needed to be able to actively exercise citizenship, as deﬁned by the Euro-
pean framework for key competences, focus on: a knowledge of basic democratic
17International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classiﬁcation-of-
education.aspx
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concepts including an understanding of society and social and political move-
ments; the European integration process and EU structures; and major social
developments, both past and present. Civic competences also require skills such
as critical thinking and communication skills, and the ability and willingness to
participate constructively in the public domain, including in the decision-making
process through voting. Finally, a sense of belonging to society at various levels,
a respect for democratic values and diversity as well as support for sustainable
development are also highlighted as integral components of civic competences.
In the context of this report, citizenship education refers to the aspects of ed-
ucation at school level intended to prepare students to become active citizens,
by ensuring that they have the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to con-
tribute to the development and well-being of the society in which they live. It
is a broad concept, which encompasses not only teaching and learning in the
classroom but also practical experiences gained through school life and activities
in wider society. It encompasses the narrower concept of `civic education', as
deﬁned by the IEA,18 which is restricted to 'knowledge and understanding of
formal institutions and processes of civic life (such as voting in elections) (IEA
2010a, p. 22)
2004/05: Age at which pupils are taught citizenship education as a sepa-
rate compulsory subject and duration of this provision in primary and general
secondary education
2010/11: Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated
into other subjects, by ages, according to national curricula
18International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
 http://www.iea.nl/
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citizenship as combined
as separate subject subject
2005 2011 2011
S E D S E D S E D
Bulgaria 18 19 1 18 19 1 7 18 11
Croatia 16 18 2 0 0 0
Cyprus 14 18 1.5 14 18 2 6 18 12
Czech Rep. 11 15 4 0 0 0 6 19 13
Estonia 10 19 3 12 18 5 8 16 3
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 12
Latvia 15 16 1 0 0 0 7 19 12
Lithuania 13 16 2 0 0 0 8 19 11
Poland 13 18 5 13 19 6 10 19 9
Romania 9 15 4 8 14 4 14 18 4
Slovakia 11 15 4 10 19 6 6 19 13
Slovenia 12 15.5 2.5 12 14 2 6 19 13
Notes: S : Starting age; E : End age; D: Duration. D=0 means not a separate
compulsory subject; if D <E-S there are years without citizenship education.
Sources: Citizenship education at school in Europe (2005), EURYDICE.
Citizenship education in Europe (2012), EURYDICE.
A.1.3 Background information: Foreign language proﬁciency
a) Source: Recommended annual instruction time in full-time com-
pulsory education in Europe 2013/14
Available data:
• Number of hours and grades attained by school year for foreign languages
1 for 9 out of 12 countries
• Number of hours and grades attained for by school year for foreign lan-
guages 2 for 6 out of 12 countries
b) Source: Key data on teaching languages at school in Europe 2012
Note: In this publication, there are also trends available in diﬀerent years;
however, the changes are usually none or small.l
Available data:
• Starting ages for the ﬁrst and second foreign languages as compulsory
subjects for all students in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary
education, 2010/11
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• Starting age and duration of ﬁrst foreign language as a compulsory subject
in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, reference
years 1993/94, 2002/03, 2006/07, 2010/11
• Starting age and duration of second foreign language as a compulsory sub-
ject in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, 2002/03,
2006/07, 2010/11
• Provision of foreign languages as core curriculum options in primary and/or
general secondary level, 2010/11
• Percentage of students learning 0, 1, 2 or more language(s) in general
upper secondary education (ISCED 3), 2004/05, 2006/07, 2009/10
• Trends in the percentage of students learning English, German and French
in lower secondary education (ISCED 2), in 2004/05, 2006/07, 2009/10
• Trends in the recommended minimum number of hours of compulsory
foreign language teaching during a notional year in primary and full-time
compulsory general secondary education, 2006/07 and 2010/11
1994 2003 2007 2011
S E S E S E S E
Bulgaria 11 19 11 19 8 19 8 19
Croatia 6 18
Cyprus 9 18 9 18 9 18 6 18
Czech Rep. 10 19 9 19 8 19 8 19
Estonia 9 19 7 19 7 19 7 19
Hungary 9 18 9 18 9 18 9 18
Latvia 9 19 9 19 9 19 9 19
Lithuania 9 18 9 18 10 18 8 18
Poland 11 19 10 19 10 19 7 19
Romania 8 18 9 19 8 18 8 18
Slovakia 10 19 10 19 10 19 8 19
Slovenia 11 19 9 19 9 19 9 19
Notes: Start and End age of ﬁrst foreign language as compulsory subject
Source: Key data on teaching languages at school in Europe 2012 (2012),
Education, Audivisual, and Culture Executive Agency
.
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A.1.4 Background information: Medals in Olympic Games
19
84
19
88
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Bulgaria 0 35 16 0 15 1 13 3 12 1 5 0 2 0
Croatia 0 0 3 0 2 0 2 4 5 3 5 3 6 1
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Czech Rep. 0 11 3 8 3 8 4 6 6 10 8
Estonia 2 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 0
Hungary 0 23 30 0 21 0 17 0 17 0 10 0 18 0
Latvia 3 0 1 0 3 0 4 1 3 2 2 4
Lithuania 2 0 1 0 5 0 3 0 5 0 5 0
Poland 0 16 19 0 17 0 14 2 10 2 10 6 10 6
Romania 53 24 18 0 20 0 26 0 19 0 8 0 9 0
Slovakia 0 3 0 5 0 6 1 6 3 4 1
Slovenia 2 3 2 0 2 1 4 0 5 3 4 8
Notes. 1984 to 1992: sum of medals at Winter and Summer games
Source: http://www.olympic.org/olympic-results
A.2 Summary statistics of sample
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Table A.2: Summary statistics by country and year II
Country - year Mean
political
orientation
(1=left,
10=right)
Share of
respondents
with
children
Mean redis-
tribution
(1=need
larger
income
diﬀ's,
10=incomes
shd be
made more
equal)
Mean proud
of
nationality
(1=not at
all, 2=not
very,
3=quite,
4=very)
Mean
conﬁdence
in the EU
(1=none at
all, 2=not
very much,
3=quite a
lot, 4=a
great deal)
Bulgaria (1997) 5.8 81.1% 5.6 3.3 2.9
Bulgaria (2005) 4.8 82.9% 5.3 3.2 2.6
Croatia (1996) 5.2 72.0% 6.0 3.2 2.2
Cyprus (2006) 5.2 68.6% 5.7 3.4 2.4
Cyprus (2011) 5.2 59.4% 7.5 3.4 2.5
Czech Republic (1991) 5.7 83.1% 2.9 2.8
Estonia (1996) 5.4 80.1% 5.5 2.9 2.7
Estonia (2011) 5.4 74.9% 7.2 2.9 2.5
Hungary (1982) 74.9% 3.6
Hungary (1998) 5.1 74.3% 7.2 3.4 2.7
Hungary (2009) 5.7 70.8% 6.4 3.3 2.5
Latvia (1996) 5.4 71.2% 4.5 2.8 2.6
Lithuania (1997) 5.8 77.7% 5.8 2.8 2.5
Poland (1989) 5.8 3.1 3.7
Poland (1997) 5.7 78.0% 4.3 3.7 2.6
Poland (2005) 5.9 70.4% 4.2 3.6 2.4
Poland (2012) 5.5 73.4% 4.7 3.6 2.3
Romania (1998) 5.3 72.3% 4.7 3.3 2.5
Romania (2005) 6.0 79.5% 6.3 3.2 2.6
Romania (2012) 5.6 76.6% 4.9 3.3 2.4
Slovakia (1990) 5.4 74.4% 4.3 3.0
Slovakia (1998) 5.3 79.8% 5.4 3.3 2.5
Slovenia (1995) 5.2 72.6% 6.5 3.5 2.4
Slovenia (2005) 5.3 71.4% 6.3 3.5 2.3
Slovenia (2011) 5.1 74.5% 7.5 3.4 2.1
Total 5.5 74.9% 5.6 3.3 2.5
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Table A.3: Summary statistics: survey waves
Wave Freq. Percent
1981-1984 1,464 5.35
1989-1993 2,328 8.5
1994-1998 10,642 38.87
2005-2009 6,871 25.1
2010-2014 6,071 22.18
Total 27,376 100
Table A.4: Summary statistics: attitudes towards redistribution
Income equality (redistribution) Freq. Percent Cum.
1 (Need larger income diﬀ's) 3,126 12.4 12.4
2 1,567 6.21 18.61
3 3,116 12.36 30.97
4 2,447 9.7 40.67
5 1,913 7.59 48.26
6 3,108 12.33 60.58
7 2,041 8.09 68.68
8 2,491 9.88 78.56
9 1,729 6.86 85.41
10 (Incomes shd be made more equal) 3,678 14.59 100
Total 25,216 100
Table A.5: Summary statistics: national pride
How proud of nationality Freq. Percent Cum.
Not at all 763 2.93 2.93
Not very 3,131 12.03 14.96
Quite 10,153 39.01 53.98
Very 11,978 46.02 100
Total 26,025 100
Table A.6: Summary statistics: conﬁdence in the EU
Conﬁdence: the European Union Freq. Percent Cum.
None at all 2,789 13.41 13.41
Not very much 7,342 35.31 48.72
Quite a lot 8,667 41.68 90.4
A great deal 1,997 9.6 100
Total 20,795 100
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Table A.7: Summary statistics: adoption of euro
Country has adopted euro currency Freq. Percent Cum.
No 23,774 86.84 86.84
Yes 3,602 13.16 100
Total 27,376 100
A.3 Trends in preference and identity variables
Figures A.1 to A.6 depict the trends in key variables across interview years and
across survey waves for those countries that joined the European Union before
2004 and those countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013.
Figure A.1: Preference for redistribution across interview years
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
Figure A.2: Preference for redistribution across survey waves
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
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Figure A.3: National pride across interview years
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
Figure A.4: National pride across survey waves
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
Figure A.5: Conﬁdence in the EU across interview years
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
36
Figure A.6: Conﬁdence in the EU across survey waves
Source: World Values Survey (European Sample), 2014
A.4 Regressions: further analysis
Tables A.8 to A.10 show the subsample analysis for diﬀerent age, income and
gender groups, respectively.
Table A.11 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression
for alternative main regressors. Columns (1) and (2) show citizencountry (I
see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation, with answers on a scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)); columns (3) and (4) show citizeneu
(I see myself as a citizen of the European Union, with answers on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)); columns (5) and (6) show
the binary variable eu_notcountry taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees
or strongly agrees to the statement I see myself as a citizen of the EU and
disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement I see myself as a citizen of the
[country] nation, and 0 otherwise; columns (7) and (8) show the binary variable
country_noteu taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees to the
statement I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation and disagrees or
strongly disagrees with the statement I see myself as a citizen of the EU, and
0 otherwise; columns (9) and (10) show the binary variable country_and_eu
taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees to both the statements
I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation and I see myself as a citizen
of the EU, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable redistribution takes values
from 1 (we need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort) to
10 (incomes should be made more equal); independent variables included are
age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married,
children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and wave squared.
Table A.12 investigates cohort eﬀects; cohort_euro is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the euro was introduced during the age 16 to 25 (impres-
sionable years); proud_cohort is national pride interacted with cohort_euro;
joineuro_cohort is joineuro interacted with cohort_euro. Column (1) shows
an OLS regression, columns (2) and (3) show the 1st and 2nd stage of an
instrumental variables regression, with joineuro_cohort as an instrument for
proud_cohort in the 2nd stage (column (3)). The dependent variable redis-
tribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income diﬀerences as incentives
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for individual eﬀort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal). Indepen-
dent variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, sec-
ondary,tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and
wave squared.
Table A.13 shows the interaction of national pride with income; proud_income
is national pride interacted with the income variable and joineuro_income is the
interaction of the variables joineuro and income. Column (1) shows an OLS re-
gression, columns (2) and (3) show the 1st and 2nd stage of an instrumental
variables regression with national pride instrumented with joineuro; columns
(4) and (5) show proud_income instrumented with joineuro_income. The de-
pendent variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income dif-
ferences as incentives for individual eﬀort) to 10 (incomes should be made more
equal). Independent variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary
incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town
size, wave, and wave squared.
Table A.14 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression
for alternative instruments; columns (1) to (4) use duration of the ﬁrst foreign
language (in years) in compulsory schooling for each country/year; columns (5)
to (8) use the ﬁrst component of a principal components analysis consisting of
the variables duration of ﬁrst foreign language, duration of citizenship education
as a separate subject, and number of medals in Olympic summer games. The
dependent variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income
diﬀerences as incentives for individual eﬀort) to 10 (incomes should be made
more equal); independent variables included are age, age squared, female, sec-
ondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed,
town size, wave, and wave squared.
Table A.15 shows the OLS regressions and Table A.16 shows the 1st and
2nd stage of an instrumental variables regressions, for the full sample of Euro-
pean countries, not only those that joined the European Union after 2003. The
countries/years included are Bulgaria (1997), Bulgaria (2005), Cyprus (2006),
Cyprus (2011), Estonia (1996), Estonia (2011), Finland (1996), Finland (2005),
France (2006), Germany (1997), Germany (2006), Germany (2013), Hungary
(1998), Hungary (2009), Italy (2005), Latvia (1996), Lithuania (1997), Nether-
lands (2006), Netherlands (2012), Poland (1997), Poland (2005), Poland (2012),
Romania (1998), Romania (2005), Romania (2012), Slovakia (1998), Slovenia
(1995), Slovenia (2005), Slovenia (2011), Spain (1995), Spain (2000), Spain
(2007), Spain (2011), Sweden (1996), Sweden (2006), Sweden (2011) and Great
Britain (2005).
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Table A.11: Additional main regressors
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Table A.12: Cohort eﬀects
OLS IV: proud_cohort instrumented
with joineuro_cohort
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable redistribution proud_cohort redistribution
proud -0.258*** 0.0521*** 1.074
(0.0306) (0.00333) (2.173)
cohort_euro 0.148 3.220*** 82
(0.422) (0.0501) (132.6)
proud_cohort 0.114 -25.52
(0.128) (41.53)
joineuro_cohort -0.0362
(0.0581)
Country FE x x x
Observations 15,904 15904 15904
R-squared 0.129 0.946 -2.027
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 15878) = 0.39
Prob > F = 0.5337
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
16.934
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
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Table A.13: Interaction of proud with income
OLS IV - Proud instrumented with joineuro IV - Proud*income instrumented with joineuro*income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable redistribution proud redistribution proud_income redistribution
proud -0.362*** -163.1 4.653*** 23.19***
(0.0654) (168.0) (0.0356) (7.651)
proud_income 0.0241* 0.166*** 27.12 -5.037***
(0.0125) (0.00108) (27.98) (1.643)
joineuro -0.0120
(0.0124)
joineuro_income -0.0425***
(0.0132)
Country FE x x x x x
Observations 15,904 15,904 15,904 15,904 15,904
R-squared 0.128 0.801 -376.265 0.950 -10.046
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 15879) = 0.94 F( 1, 15879) = 10.36
Prob > F = 0.3329 Prob > F = 0.0013
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
239.666 138.805
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
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Table A.14: Additional instruments
PC1 as instrument
Instrument: duration of ﬁrst foreign language 1st component of PCA using foreign_lang, citizeneduc, medals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable proud redistribution confeu redistribution proud redistribution confeu redistribution
foreign_lang -0.00926 0.0154
(0.00825) (0.0101)
pc1 -0.0172 0.0726***
(0.0127) (0.0156)
proud -13.00 -36.73
(11.99) (27.25)
confeu 8.623 8.178***
(6.218) (1.950)
Country FE x x x x x x x x
Observations 15,904 15,904 14,997 14,997 11,482 11,482 11,104 11,104
R-squared 0.116 -10.137 0.044 -5.868 0.103 -78.986 0.041 -5.160
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 15880) = 1.26 F( 1, 14973) = 2.31 F( 1, 11462) = 1.81 F( 1, 11084) = 21.54
Prob > F = 0.2620 Prob > F = 0.1283 Prob > F = 0.1780 Prob > F = 0.0000
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
12.544 15.67 132.181 119.666
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0004 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0001 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
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Table A.15: OLS - full sample of countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep variable redistribution
proud -0.279*** -0.205*** -0.212*** -0.239***
(0.0179) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0216)
confeu -0.253*** -0.187*** -0.166*** -0.142***
(0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0191) (0.0215)
age 0.0206*** 0.0187*** 0.0135*** 0.0138** 0.0182*** 0.0177*** 0.0126** 0.0153***
(0.00493) (0.00477) (0.00518) (0.00582) (0.00505) (0.00487) (0.00525) (0.00592)
age2 -0.000121** -0.000132*** -9.12e-05* -8.23e-05 -0.000115** -0.000142*** -9.94e-05* -0.000120**
(4.90e-05) (4.73e-05) (5.13e-05) (5.74e-05) (5.05e-05) (4.85e-05) (5.23e-05) (5.86e-05)
female 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.127*** 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.121***
(0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0284) (0.0319) (0.0277) (0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0322)
secondary -0.676*** -0.507*** -0.479*** -0.526*** -0.639*** -0.446*** -0.404*** -0.458***
_incomplete (0.0471) (0.0482) (0.0527) (0.0608) (0.0483) (0.0492) (0.0536) (0.0622)
secondary -0.382*** -0.573*** -0.459*** -0.466*** -0.335*** -0.512*** -0.391*** -0.403***
(0.0377) (0.0383) (0.0422) (0.0489) (0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0428) (0.0497)
tertiary -0.989*** -1.102*** -0.828*** -0.836*** -0.858*** -0.961*** -0.704*** -0.726***
(0.0403) (0.0410) (0.0464) (0.0541) (0.0408) (0.0415) (0.0465) (0.0543)
married -0.306*** -0.171*** -0.0437 -0.00726 -0.323*** -0.187*** -0.0752** -0.0443
(0.0324) (0.0317) (0.0342) (0.0386) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0345) (0.0389)
Dchildren -0.0531 -0.0845** -0.0974** -0.128*** -0.0421 -0.0751** -0.0724* -0.0951**
(0.0389) (0.0380) (0.0404) (0.0461) (0.0391) (0.0380) (0.0403) (0.0460)
income -0.134*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.123***
(0.00718) (0.00809) (0.00726) (0.00821)
unemployed 0.191*** 0.162** 0.216*** 0.197***
(0.0553) (0.0638) (0.0555) (0.0641)
townsize -0.0222*** -0.00833
(0.00712) (0.00720)
wave -1.212*** -0.875*** -0.428** -1.126*** -0.798*** -0.329*
(0.138) (0.150) (0.179) (0.139) (0.151) (0.181)
wave2 0.162*** 0.131*** 0.0895*** 0.157*** 0.126*** 0.0809***
(0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0200)
Constant 6.676*** 8.216*** 7.989*** 7.041*** 6.419*** 7.741*** 7.385*** 6.170***
(0.124) (0.317) (0.349) (0.416) (0.119) (0.321) (0.352) (0.423)
Country FE x x x x x x
Observations 40,178 40,178 34,069 27,876 39,008 39,008 33,401 27,132
R-squared 0.028 0.101 0.109 0.117 0.026 0.103 0.110 0.120
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.16: IV - full sample of countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable proud redistribution confeu redistribution
joineuro 0.0336* 0.0728***
(0.0195) (0.0223)
proud 19.81*
(11.77)
confeu 8.616***
(2.896)
age -0.00371** 0.0885 -0.0181*** 0.174***
(0.00168) (0.0557) (0.00180) (0.0552)
age2 8.67e-05*** -0.00182* 0.000173*** -0.00163***
(1.63e-05) (0.00108) (1.77e-05) (0.000529)
female 0.0151* -0.172 0.00840 0.0495
(0.00910) (0.255) (0.00970) (0.0939)
secondary_incomplete -0.0839*** 1.169 0.0215 -0.634***
(0.0162) (1.046) (0.0184) (0.181)
secondary -0.103*** 1.601 0.0112 -0.502***
(0.0135) (1.244) (0.0150) (0.144)
tertiary -0.204*** 3.271 0.102*** -1.611***
(0.0156) (2.434) (0.0166) (0.329)
married 0.0541*** -1.099 0.0195* -0.222*
(0.0112) (0.676) (0.0118) (0.125)
Dchildren -0.0104 0.0887 0.00594 -0.138
(0.0138) (0.306) (0.0142) (0.134)
income 0.00905*** -0.302*** 0.0293*** -0.373***
(0.00229) (0.114) (0.00242) (0.0866)
unemployed -0.0891*** 1.956* -0.0511*** 0.652***
(0.0191) (1.124) (0.0195) (0.237)
townsize -0.0159*** 0.296 0.0180*** -0.167***
(0.00204) (0.191) (0.00217) (0.0564)
wave -0.103** 1.506 0.00734 -0.547
(0.0503) (1.543) (0.0550) (0.521)
wave2 0.0143*** -0.201 -0.00193 0.0973*
(0.00548) (0.206) (0.00595) (0.0566)
Constant 3.497*** -62.55 2.911*** -18.72**
(0.116) (41.00) (0.130) (8.201)
Country FE x x x x
Observations 27,876 27,876 27,132 27,132
R-squared 0.130 -28.348 0.071 -5.967
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 27845) = 2.96 F( 1, 27101) = 10.69
Prob > F = 0.0853 Prob > F = 0.0011
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:
85.196 74.284
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.000047
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